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Abstract
In this work, we introduce decentralized network interdiction games, which model the interactions
among multiple interdictors with differing objectives operating on a common network. As a starting
point, we focus on decentralized shortest path interdiction (DSPI) games, where multiple interdictors
try to increase the shortest path lengths of their own adversaries, who all attempt to traverse a com-
mon network. We first establish results regarding the existence of equilibria for DSPI games under
both discrete and continuous interdiction strategies. To compute such an equilibrium, we present a re-
formulation of the DSPI games, which leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) with
non-shared constraints. While such a problem is computationally challenging in general, we show that
under continuous interdiction actions, a DSPI game can be formulated as a linear complementarity prob-
lem and solved by Lemke’s algorithm. In addition, we present decentralized heuristic algorithms based
on best response dynamics for games under both continuous and discrete interdiction strategies. Finally,
we establish theoretical bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss of equilibria in DSPI games, with such
loss caused by the lack of coordination among noncooperative interdictors, and use the decentralized
algorithms to empirically study the average-case efficiency loss.
1 Introduction
In an interdiction problem, an agent attempts to limit the actions of an adversary operating on a network
by intentionally disrupting certain components of the network. Such problems are usually modeled in the
framework of leader-follower games and can be formulated as bilevel optimization problems. Interdiction
models have been used in various military and homeland security applications, such as dismantling drug
traffic networks [45], preventing nuclear smuggling [30] and planning tactical air strikes [22]. Interdiction
models have also found applications in other areas such as controlling the spread of pandemics [3] and
defending attacks on computer communication networks [39].
Traditionally, interdiction problems have been analyzed from a centralized perspective; namely, a single
agent is assumed to analyze, compute and implement interdiction strategies. In many situations, however, it
might be desirable and even necessary to consider an interdiction problem from a decentralized perspective.
For instance, a supervising body, in control of multiple agents in a common system, may assign each agent to
an adversary of interest. Each agent is then responsible for computing and implementing its own interdiction
strategy against the designated adversary. Other situations may involve multiple independent agents, such
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as security agencies of different countries, trying to achieve a common goal on a shared network. Without
any coordination between the agents, one might expect that a decentralized interdiction strategy may be
inefficient compared to one determined by a central decision maker. This paper is focused on modeling and
analyzing such settings and the inefficiencies that may arise.
In this paper, we introduce decentralized network interdiction (DNI) games, in which multiple agents
with differing objectives are interested in interdicting parts of a common network. We focus on a specific
class of these games, which we call decentralized shortest path interdiction (DSPI) games. We investi-
gate various properties of equilibria in DSPI games, including their existence and uniqueness, and propose
algorithms to compute equilibria of these games. Using these algorithms, we also conduct empirical stud-
ies on the efficiency loss of equilibria in the DSPI game compared to optimal solutions obtained through
centralized decision making.
Decentralized network interdiction games, as will be formally defined in Section 2, appear to be new.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no previous research on such games. As a result, not much
is known about the inefficiency of equilibria for these games or intervention strategies to reduce such in-
efficiencies. There has been a considerable amount of work, however, on interdiction problems from a
centralized decision-maker’s perspective. As mentioned earlier, interdiction problems have been studied in
the context of various military and security applications. For extensive reviews of the existing academic
literature on interdiction problems, we refer the readers to Church et al. [8] and Smith and Lim [39].
There have also been many studies on the inefficiency of equilibria in other game-theoretic settings.
Most of the efforts have been focused on routing games [33,44], in which selfish agents route traffic through
a congested network, and congestion games [36], a generalization of routing games. Some examples include
[4, 7, 9, 11, 37, 40]. Several researchers have also studied the inefficiency of equilibria in network formation
games, in which agents form a network subject to potentially conflicting connectivity goals [1, 2, 15]. The
inefficiency of equilibria has been studied in other games as well, such as facility location games [43],
scheduling games [28], and resource allocation games [25, 26]. Almost all of the work described above
study the worst-case inefficiency of a given equilibrium concept. Although a few researchers have studied
the average inefficiency of equilibria, either theoretically or empirically, and have used it as a basis to design
interventions to reduce the inefficiency of equilibria [10,41], research in this direction has not received much
attention.
One potential reason for the lack of attention paid to decentralized network interdiction games may
be that such games often involve nondifferentiability, as each interdictor’s optimization problem usually
entails a max-min type of objective functions. Games involving nondifferentiable functions are generally
challenging, in terms of both theoretical analysis of their equilibria and computing an equilibrium. While
in some cases (such as in the case of shortest path interdiction), a smooth formulation (through total uni-
modularity and duality) is possible, such a reformulation will lead the resulting network game to the class
of generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs), in which both the agents’ objective functions as well
as their feasible action spaces depend on other agents’ actions. Although the conceptual framework of
GNEPs can be dated to Debreu [13], rigorous theoretical and algorithmic treatments of GNEPs only be-
gan in recent years [17]. Several techniques have been proposed to solve GNEPs, including penalty-based
approaches [18, 21], variational-inequality-based approaches [32], Newton’s method [14], projection meth-
ods [46], and relaxation approaches [29,42]. Most of the work on GNEPs has focused on games with shared
constraints due to their tractability [16, 23]. In such games, a set of identical constraints appear in each
agent’s feasible action set. However, as will be seen later, in a typical decentralized network interdiction
game, the constraints involving multiple agents’ actions that appear in each agent’s action space are not
identical. As a result, such games give rise to more challenging instances of GNEPs.
Based on the discussions above, the major contributions of this work are as follows. First, we estab-
lish the existence of equilibria for DSPI games with continuous interdiction. In DSPI games with discrete
interdiction, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) is more subtle. We first demonstrate
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that a PNE does not necessarily exist in general discrete DSPI games. However, when all agents have the
same source-target pairs (i.e., multiple agents try to achieve a common goal independently), a PNE exists
in discrete DSPI games. Second, for DSPI games under continuous interdiction, we show that each agent’s
optimization problem can be reformulated as a linear programming problem. As a result, the equilibrium
conditions of the game can be reformulated as a linear complementarity problem with some favorable prop-
erties, allowing it to be solved by the well-known Lemke algorithm. For discrete DSPI games (and for
continuous games as well), we present decentralized algorithms for finding an equilibrium, based on the
well-known best-response dynamics (or Gauss-Seidel iterative) approach. While such an approach is only
a heuristic method in general, convergence can be established for the special case when the agents have
common source-target pairs. For more general cases, we obtain encouraging empirical results for the per-
formance of the method on several classes of network structures. Third, in measuring the efficiency loss
of DSPI games due to the lack of coordination among noncooperative interdictors, as compared to a cen-
tralized interdiction strategy (that is, a strategy implemented by a single interdictor with respect to all the
adversaries), we establish a theoretical lower bound for the worst-case price of anarchy of DSPI games
under continuous interdiction. Such an efficiency loss measure, however, may be too conservative, and
we therefore use the decentralized algorithms to empirically quantify the average-case efficiency loss over
some instances of DSPI games. These results can help central authorities design mechanisms to reduce such
efficiency losses for practical instances.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 with definitions and for-
mulations of DNI games and DSPI games. In Section 3, we present the main theoretical results of the
paper, including an analysis of the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in DSPI games. In Section 4 we
investigate algorithms for solving DSPI games. We describe a centralized algorithm based on a linear com-
plementarity formulation, as well as decentralized algorithms for computing equilibria of DSPI games. We
also give results of our computational experiments with these algorithms for computing equilibria as well
as quantifying the price of anarchy for various instances. Finally, in Section 5, we provide some concluding
remarks.
2 Decentralized Network Interdiction Games
2.1 Formulation
Network interdiction problems involve interactions between two types of parties – adversaries and interdic-
tors – with conflicting interests. An adversary operates on a network and attempts to optimize some objec-
tive, such as the flow between two nodes. An interdictor tries to limit an adversary’s objective by changing
elements of the network, such as the arc capacities. Such interactions have historically been viewed from a
leader-follower-game perspective. The interdictor acts as the leader and chooses an action while anticipating
the adversary’s potential responses, while the adversary acts as the follower and makes a move after observ-
ing the interdictor’s actions. From the interdictor’s perspective, this captures the pessimistic viewpoint of
guarding against the worst possible result given its actions.
In this work, we consider strategic interactions among multiple interdictors who operate on a common
network. The interdictors may each have their own adversary or have a common adversary. If there are
multiple adversaries, we assume there is no strategic interaction among them. We also assume that the
interdictors are allies in the sense that they are not interested in deliberately impeding each other.
Formally, we have a setF = {1, . . . , F} of interdictors or agents, who operate on a networkG = (V,A),
where V is the set of nodes and A is the set of arcs. Each agent’s actions or decisions correspond to
interdicting each arc of the network with varying intensity: the decision variables of agent f ∈ F are
denoted by xf ∈ Xf ⊂ R|A|, where Xf is an abstract set that constrains agent f ’s decisions. For any
agent f ∈ F , let x−f denote the collection of all the other agents’ decision variables; that is, x−f =
(x1, . . . , xf−1, xf+1, . . . , xF ). The network obtained after every agent executes its decisions or interdiction
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strategies is called the aftermath network. The strategic interaction between the agents occurs due to the
fact that the properties of each arc in the aftermath network are affected by the combined decisions of all the
agents.
In addition to the abstract constraint set Xf , we assume that each agent f ∈ F faces a total interdiction
budget of bf . The cost of interdicting an arc is linear in the intensity of interdiction; in particular, agent f ’s
cost of interdicting arc (u, v) by xfuv units is c
f
uvx
f
uv. Without loss of generality, we assume that bf > 0 and
cfuv > 0 for each arc (u, v) ∈ A and for each agent f ∈ F .
The optimization problem for each agent f ∈ F is:
maximize
xf
θf (xf , x−f )
subject to
∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤ bf ,
xf ∈ Xf ,
(1)
where the objective function θf is agent f ’s obstruction function, or measure of how much agent f ’s adver-
sary has been obstructed. Henceforth, we refer to the game in which each agent f ∈ F solves the above
optimization problem (1) as a decentralized network interdiction (DNI) game. The obstruction function θf
can capture various types of interdiction problems. Typically θf is the (implicit) optimal value function of
the adversary’s network optimization problem parametrized by the agents’ decisions, which usually mini-
mizes flow cost or path length subject to flow conservation, arc capacity and side constraints.
Suppose that a central planner, with a comprehensive view of the network and the agents’ objectives,
could pool the agents’ interdiction resources and determine an interdiction strategy that maximizes some
global measure of how much the agents’ adversaries have been obstructed. Let θc(x1, . . . , xF ) represent
the global obstruction function for a given interdiction strategy (x1, . . . , xF ). The central planner’s problem
corresponding to the DNI game (1) is then:
maximize
x1, ..., xF
θc(x1, . . . , xF )
subject to
∑
f∈F
∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤
∑
f∈F
bf ,
xf ∈ Xf ∀f ∈ F .
(2)
We refer to (2) as the centralized problem, and focus primarily on when the global obstruction function is
utilitarian; that is,
θc(x1, . . . , xF ) :=
∑
f∈F
θf (xf , x−f ).
As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of this work is to quantify the inefficiency of an equilibrium of a DNI
game – a decentralized solution to problem (1) – relative to a centrally planned optimal solution – an optimal
solution to problem (2). A commonly used measure of such inefficiency is the price of anarchy. Formally
speaking, let NI be the set of all equilibria corresponding to a specific instance I . (In the context of DNI
games, an instance consists of the network, obstruction functions, interdiction budgets, and costs). For the
same instance I , let (x1
∗
, . . . , xF
∗
) denote a global optimal solution to the centralized problem (2). Then
the price of anarchy of the instance I is defined as
p(I) := max
(x1N ,...,x
F
N )∈NI
θc(x1
∗
, . . . xF
∗
)
θc(x1N , . . . , x
F
N )
. (3)
Let I be the set of all instances of a game. We assume implicitly that for all I ∈ I, the set NI is nonempty
and a global optimal solution to the centralized problem exists. By convention, p is set to 1 if the worst
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equilibrium as well as the global optimal solution to the centralized problem both have zero objective value.
If the worst equilibrium has a zero objective value while the global optimal value of the centralized problem
is nonzero, p is set to be infinity. In addition to the price of anarchy for an instance of a game, we also define
the worst-case price of anarchy over all instances of the game (denoted as w.p.o.a) as follows:
w.p.o.a := sup
I∈I
p(I). (4)
Since we wish to study the properties of a class of games such as DNI games, rather than a particular
instance of a game, we are more interested in the worst-case price of anarchy. However, there are two major
difficulties associated with such an efficiency measure. First, it is well-known that the worst-case price
of anarchy may be a very conservative measure of efficiency loss, since the worst case may only happen
with pathological instances. Second, explicit theoretical bounds on the worst-case price of anarchy may be
difficult to obtain for general classes of games. In fact most of the related research has focused on identifying
classes of games where such bounds may be derived. In this work, we show how our proposed decentralized
algorithms can be used to empirically study the average-case efficiency loss (denoted by a.e.l). Let I ′ denote
a finite set such that I ′ ⊂ I, and let |I ′| denote the cardinality of the the set I ′. Then
a.e.l(I ′) := 1|I ′|
∑
I∈I′
p(I). (5)
In other words, the average-case efficiency loss is the average value of p(I) as defined in (3) over a set of
sampled instances I ′ ⊂ I of a game.
As mentioned above, the generic form of problem (1) can be used to describe various network inter-
diction settings, such as maximum flow interdiction. To start with models that are both theoretically and
computationally tractable, we focus on decentralized shortest-path interdiction games, which we describe in
detail next.
2.1.1 Decentralized Shortest Path Interdiction Games
As the name suggests, decentralized shortest path interdiction (DSPI) games involve agents or interdictors
whose adversaries are interested in the shortest path between source-target node pairs on a network. Inter-
dictors act in advance to increase the length of the shortest path of their respective adversaries by interdicting
(in particular, lengthening) arcs on the network.
To describe these games formally, we build upon the setup of the general decentralized network inter-
diction game described in Section 2.1. Each agent f ∈ F has a target node tf ∈ V that it wishes to protect
from an adversary at source node sf ∈ V by maximizing the length of the shortest path between the two
nodes. The agents achieve this goal by committing some resources (e.g. monetary spending) to increase the
individual arc lengths on the network: the decision variable xfuv represents the contribution of agent f ∈ F
towards lengthening arc (u, v) ∈ A. The arc length duv(xf , x−f ) of arc (u, v) ∈ A in the aftermath network
depends on the decisions of all the agents.
We consider two types of interdiction. The first type of interdiction is continuous: in particular,
Xf := {xf ∈ R|A| : xfuv ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ A}.
The arc lengths after an interdiction strategy (x1, . . . , xF ) has been executed are
duv(x
1, . . . , xF ) = d0uv +
∑
f∈F
xfuv ∀(u, v) ∈ A, (6)
where xfuv captures how much agent f extends the length of arc (u, v). We assume that d0uv > 0 for all
(u, v) ∈ A.
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The second type of interdiction is discrete: in this case,
Xf := {xf ∈ R|A| : xfuv ∈ {0, 1} ∀(u, v) ∈ A}
and the arc lengths in the aftermath network are
duv(x
1, . . . , xF ) = d0uv + euv max
f∈F
xfuv ∀(u, v) ∈ A, (7)
where euv ∈ R≥0 is the fixed extension of arc (u, v). In other words, the length of an arc is extended by a
fixed amount if at least one agent decides to interdict it.
Let P f = {pf1 , pf2 , . . . , pfkf } be the set of sf − tf paths available to agent f ∈ F . The length of a path
p ∈ P f is given by
dp(x
1, . . . , xF ) =
∑
(u,v)∈p
duv(x
1, . . . , xF ), (8)
where duv(x1, . . . , xF ) is as defined in equation (6) for continuous interdiction, and as defined in (7) for the
discrete case.
The optimization problem for each interdicting agent f ∈ F is then:
maximize
xf
θf (xf , x−f ) ≡ min
p∈Pf
dp(x
f , x−f )
subject to
∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤ bf ,
xf ∈ Xf .
(9)
Under continuous interdiction and the general assumption made ealier that Xf is nonempty, convex and
compact, the feasible strategy set for agent f , given by {xf ∈ Xf |∑(u,v)∈A cfuvxfuv ≤ bf} is also convex
and compact. To rule out uninteresting cases, we also assume that the feasible set for each agent is also
nonempty (meaning that each agent has the budget to at least interdict one arc). Moreover, given an x−f ,
the objective function in (9) is the minimum of a set of affine functions of xf , and therefore continuous in
xf . Thus, by Weirstrass’s extreme value theorem, each agent has an optimal strategy given the strategies of
the other agents. Note, however, that the objective function in (9) is not differentiable with respect to xf in
general.
For DSPI games with discrete interdiction, the feasible strategy set for each agent is finite. Therefore
an optimal solution to each agent’s problem always exists with a given x−f . In the following section,
we analyze the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash Equilibria for DSPI games, under both
continuous and discrete settings.
3 Game Structure and Analysis
3.1 Existence of Equilibria
We first consider the existence of a Nash equilibrium of a DSPI game when interdiction decisions are
continuous. The key is to show that the objective function in (9), θf (xf , x−f ), is concave in xf , despite the
fact that it is not differentiable.
Proposition 1. Given that each agent f ∈ F solves the problem (9), with dp(xf , x−f ) defined as in (8) and
(6), and assume that the abstract set Xf in (9) is nonempty, convex and compact for each f ∈ F , the DSPI
game under continuous interdiction has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Based on the assumption, the feasible region in (9) is nonempty, convex and compact. With a fixed
x−f , the objective function of agent f is the minimum of a finite set of affine functions in xf , and therefore,
is concave with respect to xf , by the well-known fact in convex analysis (Cf. [6]). Consequently, the DSPI
game belongs to the class of “concave games,” introduced in Rosen [35], and it is shown in [35] that a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists for a concave game.
Under discrete interdiction, the existence of a PNE is not always guaranteed when different interdictors
are competing against different adversaries. We illustrate the nonexistence of PNE in Example 1 below.
Example 1. Consider the network given in Figure 1.
s1
s2
t1, t2
b
e
c d
a
f
Figure 1: Network topology for DSPI game in Example 1.
In this game, there are two agents – agent 1 and agent 2 – who are attempting to maximize the lengths
of the s1-t1 paths and s2-t2 paths respectively. Note that t1 = t2. The data for the problem, including initial
arc lengths, cost of interdiction and arc extensions are given below in Table 1.
Arc tag Initial length Arc extension Cost to player 1 Cost to player 2
a 7 0.5 3 20
b 0 2 6 20
c 0 1.5 5 20
d 0 6 15 15
e 0 1 20 20
f 1 6 15 15
Table 1: Network data for Example 1
Suppose b1 = 8 and b2 = 15. As a result, player 1 can either interdict the arcs a, b and c one at a time,
or the arcs a and c simultaneously. Similarly, player 2 can either interdict arc d or arc f .
Thus, player 1 has four feasible pure strategies and player 2 has two feasible pure strategies. The strategy
tuples along with the corresponding pay-offs for each player are summarized in Table 2. It is easy to verify
that for any joint strategy profile, there is a player who would prefer to deviate unilaterally. Therefore, this
instance of the DSPI game does not possess a NE.
In the previous example, the agents have a common target node, but different source nodes. However, in
the class of games in which the interdictors have a common adversary, i.e., when each agent maximizes the
shortest path between a common source-target pair, we can show that DSPI games under discrete interdiction
possess a PNE.
Consider the DSPI game where each agent is trying to maximize the shortest path lengths between
nodes s and t. Since the objective function of each agent is the same, we can write the following centralized
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P1/P2 strategies d f
a 6, 1 0, 0
c 7, 1 1.5, 1.6
(a, c) 7.5, 1 1.5, 1.5
b 7, 1 2, 0
Table 2: Pay-off combinations for Example 1
optimization problem to maximize the shortest s − t path distance subject to the individual agents’ budget
constraints. Let P st be the set of s− t paths in the network. The centralized optimization problem is:
maximize
x
min
p∈P st
dp(x
1, x2, . . . , xF )
subject to
∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤ bf ∀f ∈ F ,
xfuv ∈ {0, 1} ∀(u, v) ∈ A, f ∈ F .
(10)
The feasible solution space of the above problem is finite under individual agents’ budget constraints. There-
fore, the centralized problem always has a maximum. Furthermore, the optimal solution to this problem is a
PNE of the DSPI game as we show in the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose the source and target for each agent in a DSPI problem are the same. Let x∗ denote
the optimal solution of the centralized problem (10). Then x∗ is a PNE to the DSPI game under discrete
interdiction.
Proof. Assume the contrary, and suppose that there is an agent h for whom there exists a unilateral deviation
xf that strictly increases the path distance s− t. By assumption, xh is feasible to the budgetary constraints
for agent h. Therefore, x¯ ≡ (xh, x∗−h) is feasible to (10) with a strictly larger objective value. Clearly this
is a contradiction to the optimality of x∗ to (10).
3.1.1 Uniqueness of equilibria
Establishing sufficient conditions for a DSPI game to have a unique equilibrium is quite difficult. However,
it is easy to find simple instances of DSPI games for which multiple equilibria exist. We give two such
examples below.
Example 2. Consider the following instance, based on the network in Figure 2. There are 2 agents: agent 1
has an adversary with source node 1 and target node 5; agent 2 has an adversary with source node 1 and
target node 6. The initial arc lengths are 0, interdiction is continuous, and the interdiction costs are the same
for both agents and are given in the arc labels in Figure 2. Both agents have a budget of 1. Consider the case
when  = 2. In this case, it is straightforward to see that the source-target path lengths for each agent must
be equal at an equilibrium: if the path lengths are unequal, an agent could improve its objective function by
equalizing the path lengths. Therefore, in this example, any combination of decision variables that results in
a shortest path length of 2/3 for each agent will be a generalized Nash equilibrium, and there is a continuum
of such decision variable combinations. Indeed some of such equilibria are given in Table 3 in Section 4.5.
Example 3. Under discrete interdiction on the same underlying network, an interesting situation occurs
when  = 0, the budget is 1, and the arc extensions are all set to 1. In this case, an equilibrium occurs
when the arcs (1, 4) and (1, 2) are interdicted by one agenteach. What is interesting however is that there
exist equilibria that have inferior objective values for both agents. Indeed, the extreme case of neither agent
interdicting any arc can easily seen to be an equilibrium. This point in fact is a social utility minimizer over
the set of feasible action combinations for the two agents.
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1 2 3
4 5 6
1 +  1 + 
1 +  1 + 
1 1 1
Figure 2: Network topology for DSPI game in Example 2.
4 Computing a Nash Equilibrium
In this section we discuss algorithms to compute equilibria of DSPI games. While the general formula-
tion with each agent solving (9) is sufficient for showing existence of equilibria, such a formulation is not
amenable for computing an equilibrium mainly due to the ‘min’ function in the objective function. In this
section, using a well-known reformulation of shortest path problems (through total unimodularity and linear
programming duality), we obtain a generalized Nash equilibrium problem of the DSPI game. For contin-
uous DSPI games, we further show that such a GNEP can be written as a linear complementarity problem
(LCP) through the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions. We then show that the resulting LCP
has favorable properties, allowing the use of Lemke’s pivoting algorithm with guaranteed convergence to a
solution (as opposed to a secondary ray).
We refer to the LCP approach as a centralized approach, in the sense that the game is purely viewed
as a system of equilibrium conditions, and a general algorithm capable of solving the resulting system is
applied. We also present decentralized algorithms based on best-response dynamics, which are applicable to
both continuous and discrete DSPI games. While not necessarily computationally more efficient, decentral-
ized algorithms indeed have several advantages over centralized algorithms. First, a centralized algorithm
usually cannot solve discrete games, which can nevertheless be solved by a decentralized approach, aided
by integer programming solvers. Second, a decentralized algorithm may provide insight on how a partic-
ular equilibrium is achieved among agents’ strategic interactions. Such insight is particularly useful when
multiple equilibria exist, as is the case for many GNEPs. It is well-known (for example, [31]) that a game
may possess unintuitive Nash equilibria that would never realistically be the outcome of the game. Third,
a decentralized algorithm can naturally lead to multithreaded implementations that can take advantage of
a high performance computing environment. In addition, different threads in a multithreaded implementa-
tion may be able to find different equilibria of a game, making such an algorithm particularly suitable for
computationally quantifying the average efficiency loss of noncooperative strategies.
In the following discussion, we first present the GNEP formulation of DSPI games under continuous
interdiction. We then reformulate the GNEP as an LCP and analyze the properties of the LCP formulation.
Finally we present the decentralized algorithms for both discrete and continuous DSPI games formulated as
GNEPs.
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4.1 Dual GNEP formulation
In (9), each agent’s objective function θf (xf , x−f ) involves its adversary’s shortest path problem, which
can be written as an integer program as follows:
θf (xf , x−f ) =

min
zf
∑
(u,v)∈A
zfuv duv(x
f , x−f )
s.t.
∑
v∈V
zfuv −
∑
v∈V
zfvu =

1 if u = sf
0 if u 6= sf , tf
−1 if u = tf
zfuv ∈ {0, 1} ∀(u, v) ∈ A

, (11)
where the binary variables zfuv represents whether an arc (u, v) ∈ A is in the shortest sf -tf path. Al-
though the inner minimization problem is an integer program with binary variables, it is well known that
the constraint matrix is totally unimodular (e.g. [38]), rendering the integer program equivalent to its linear
programming relaxation. Therefore, once the interdictors’ variables (x1, . . . , xF ) are fixed, we can use lin-
ear programming duality to transform the inner minimization problem to a maximization problem [24] and
reformulate agent f ’s optimization problem (1) as:
maximize
xf , yf
yf
tf
− yf
sf
subject to yfv − yfu ≤ duv(xf , x−f ) ∀(u, v) ∈ A,∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤ bf ,
xf ∈ Xf ,
yfv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V.
(12)
It is also well-known (see, for example, [5, 27]) that at optimality, the term yfu − yfsf is equal to the length
of the shortest sf -u path in the aftermath network. This is the reason why we are able to restrict the yf
variables to be non-negative. In addition, it also allows us to restrict the yf variables to be integral if the
underlying network data is integral, since at optimality all path lengths would also be integral. Moreover, as
we show below, it also allows us to bound the yf variables.
When interdiction is continuous, the largest possible length in the aftermath network for any arc is
bounded by the largest interdiction possible on that arc. Keeping the budgetary constraints in mind, the
maximum length of any arc (u, v) ∈ A in the aftermath network is bounded by
d0uv + F · max
f∈F , (u,v)∈A
{
bf
cfuv
}
.
Therefore, the length of any path in the aftermath network is bounded above by
M =
∑
(u,v)∈A
d0uv + |A| F · max
f∈F , a∈A
{
bf
cfa
}
.
On the other hand, when interdiction is discrete, the length of any path in the aftermath network is bounded
above by M =
∑
(u,v)∈A(d
0
uv + euv).
Since only the differences yfv −yfu across arcs (u, v) are relevant to the formulation (12), we may always
replace yfu by y
f
u − yfsf for each u ∈ V to obtain a feasible solution with equal objective value. Therefore
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we can then add the constraints 0 ≤ yfu ≤ M for all u ∈ V to the problem (12) to obtain an equivalent
formulation of a DSPI game, where each agent f ∈ F solves the following problem:
maximize
xf , yf
yf
tf
− yf
sf
subject to yfv − yfu ≤ duv(xf , x−f ) ∀(u, v) ∈ A,∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤ bf ,
0 ≤ yfu ≤M ∀u ∈ V,
xf ∈ Xf .
(13)
When analyzing the DSPI game from a centralized decision-making perspective, we assume that the
global obstruction function is utilitarian, i.e., the sum of the shortest sf -tf path lengths over all the agents f ∈
F . We also assume that the resources are pooled among all the agents, resulting in a common budgetary
constraint. Thus the centralized problem for DSPI games can be given as follows:
maximize
x, y
∑
f∈F
(
yf
tf
− yf
sf
)
subject to yfv − yfu ≤ duv(xf , x−f ) ∀(u, v) ∈ A, f ∈ F ,∑
f∈F
∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤
∑
f∈F
bf
0 ≤ yfu ≤M ∀u ∈ V, f ∈ F ,
xf ∈ Xf ∀f ∈ F .
(14)
Since yf is bounded for all f ∈ F , the feasible set for (14) is a compact set. Thus a globally optimal solution
exists regardless of whether xf is continuous or discrete for all f ∈ F . In the continuous case, Weierstrass’s
extreme value theorem applies since all the functions are continuous and the xf variables are bounded due
to the non-negativity and budgetary constraints. In the discrete case, there are only a finite number of values
that the xf variables can take.
The formulation (13) gives us some insight into the structure of strategic interactions among agents in
a DSPI game. Note that in formulation (13), the objective function for each agent f ∈ F only depends
on variables indexed by f (in particular, yf
sf
and yf
tf
). However, the constraint set for each agent f is
parametrized by other agents’ variables x−f , which leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem.
Formally speaking, consider a simultaneous-move game with complete information.1 As before, let
F = {1, . . . , F} denote the set of agents. Let the scalar-valued function θf (χf , χ−f ) be the utility function
of agent f ∈ F , which is a function of all the agents actions (χf , χ−f ). The feasible action space of agent
f ∈ F is a set-valued mapping Ξf (χ−f ) with dimension nf (in a regular Nash equilibrium problem, each
agent’s feasible action space is a fixed set). Let n :=
∑
f∈F nf . Then Ξ
f (·) is a mapping from R(n−nf ) to
Rnf . Parametrized by the other agents’ decisions χ−f , each agent f ∈ F in a GNEP solves the following
problem:
maximize
χf
θf (χf , χ−f )
subject to χf ∈ Ξf (χ−f ).
(15)
1A game is said to be simultaneous-move if the agents must make their decisions without being aware of the other agents’
decisions. A game has complete information if the number of agents, their payoffs and their feasible action spaces are common
knowledge to all the agents.
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It is straightforward to see how the DSPI game in (13) translates into a GNEP problem: for all f ∈ F ,
χf = (xf , yf ),
θf (χf , χ−f ) = yf
tf
− yf
sf
,
Ξf (χ−f ) =

χf = (xf , yf )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
yfv − yfu ≤ duv(xf , x−f ) ∀(u, v) ∈ A,∑
(u,v)∈A
cfuvx
f
uv ≤ bf ,
0 ≤ yfu ≤M ∀u ∈ V,
xf ∈ Xf

.
(16)
Note that χ = (χ1, . . . , χF ) ∈ Rn, where n = F (|V |+ |A|).
To formally define a Nash equilibrium to a GNEP, we let Ω(χ) denote the Cartesian product of the
feasible sets of each agent corresponding to decisions χ = (χ1, . . . , χF ); that is,
Ω(χ) := Ξ1(χ−1)× Ξ2(χ−2)× · · · × ΞF (χ−F ). (17)
For a simultaenous-move GNEP with each agent solving problem (15), a generalized Nash equilibrium is
defined as follows:
Definition 1. A vector χN = (χ1N , . . . , χ
F
N ) ∈ Ω(χN ) is a pure-strategy generalized Nash equilibrium
(PGNE) if for each agent f ∈ F ,
θf (χfN , χ
−f
N ) ≥ θf (χf , χ−fN ), ∀ χf ∈ Ξf (χ−fN ). (18)
Based on the above definitions and discussions, it is easy to see that if (x, y) is an equilibrium to a DSPI
game formulated as a GNEP using the primal-dual formulation, then x is must be an equilibrium to the DSPI
game using only the primal formulation. Such a relationship is formally stated below.
Proposition 3. Suppose that χ = (x, y) ∈ RF×(|A|+|V |) is a PGNE to the GNEP where each agent solves
(16). Then x is a PNE to the DSPI game where each agent solves (9). 
For the remainder of the paper, we will mainly use the GNEP formulation, as our focus is shifting from
establishing theoretical properties of DSPI equilibria to computing such an equilibrium. For continuous
interdiction, the GNEP formulation can be further reformulated as an LCP, as we show below. On the
other hand, under discrete interdiction, we show that certain classes of DSPI games admit provably conver-
gent decentralized algorithms. In this case, we sequentially solve agents’ problems (16) using an integer
programming solver.
4.2 Linear Complementarity Formulation
Before presenting the LCP formulation for the DSPI game, we introduce some basic notation and definitions.
Formally, given a vector q ∈ Rd and a matrix M ∈ Rd×d, a linear complementarity problem LCP(q,M)
consists of finding a decision variable vector w ∈ Rd such that
w ≥ 0, (19)
q +Mw ≥ 0, (20)
wT (q +Mw) = 0. (21)
The LCP(q,M) is said to be feasible if there exists a w ∈ Rd that satisfies (19) and (20). Any w satisfying
(21) is called complementary. If w is both feasible and complementary, it is called a solution of the LCP,
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and the set of such solutions is denoted by SOL(q,M). The LCP is said to be solvable if it has a solution.
A thorough exposition of the theory and algorithms for LCPs can be found in [12].
Consider now the DSPI game with continuous interdiction, introduced in Section 2.1.1, where agent f ’s
optimization problem is given in (12). When the interdiction decisions of the agents f ′ 6= f are fixed, (12) is
a linear program (LP). In this case, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for a given feasible
solution to be optimal.
In order to present the LCP reformulation in a more compact form, we introduce the following notation.
Let |V | = n and |A| = m. Denote by G the arc-node incidence matrix of the graph G. Further let I denote
an identity matrix, and 0 be a vector or a matrix of all zeros, of appropriate dimensions, respectively. The
objective function coefficients for the LP (12), denoted by φf ∈ Rm+n can be given as follows:
φf =
[
0m
νf
]
, where νf =

1 if u = sf
0 if u 6= sf , tf
−1 if u = tf
.
The right hand sides for the constraints are denoted as the vector rf (x−f ) ∈ Rm+1:
rf (x−f ) =
[
−d0
−bf
]
−
∑
f ′∈F
f ′ 6=f
[
Im 0m×n
0Tm 0
T
n
][
xf
′
yf
′
]
.
The constraint matrix itself, denoted as Af ∈ R(m+1)×(m+n), is
Af =
[
Im G
−cf T 0Tn
]
.
Using this notation, the LP (12) can be restated as follows:
minimize
xf ,yf
φf
T
[
xf
yf
]
subject to Af
[
xf
yf
]
≥ rf (x−f ),[
xf
yf
]
≥ 0.
(22)
Let the dual variables for the LP (22) be (λf , βf , υf ), where λf are the multipliers for the arc potential
constraints, βf the multiplier for the budgetary constraint and υf the multipliers for the non-negativity
constraints. The KKT conditions for (22) are given by the following system.
rf (x−f ) ≤ Af
[
xf
yf
]
⊥
[
λf
βf
]
≥ 0,
0 ≤
[
xf
yf
]
⊥ υf ≥ 0,
φf −Af T
[
λf
βf
]
− υf = 0.
(23)
The KKT system (23) can be rewritten in the following form:
υf = φf −Af T
[
λf
βf
]
≥ 0,
[
xf
yf
]
≥ 0,
[
xf
yf
]T
υf = 0,
tf = −rf (x−f ) +Af
[
xf
yf
]
≥ 0,
[
λf
βf
]
≥ 0, tf T
[
λf
βf
]
= 0.
(24)
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In this form, it is easy to recognize that for a fixed value of x−f , the KKT system is equivalent to the
LCP(qf (x−f ),Mf ) where
qf (x−f ) =
[
φf
−rf (x−f )
]
and Mf =
[
0(m+n)×(m+n) −Af T
Af 0(m+1)×(m+1)
]
. (25)
The decision variable vector for the LCP is the vector of combined decision variables wf :=
(xf , yf , λf , βf )T . Each agent’s KKT system (24) is parametrized by the collective decisions of other agents.
Now by stacking all agents’ KKT systems together, the resulting model is itself an LCP, which can be seen
from the following algebraic manipulation.
First consider the following system obtained from (24) by expanding rf (x−f ).
υf = φf −Af T
[
λf
βf
]
≥ 0,
[
xf
yf
]
≥ 0,
[
xf
yf
]T
υf = 0,
tf =
[
d0
bf
]
+Af
[
xf
yf
]
+
∑
f ′∈F
f ′ 6=f
[
Im 0m×n
0Tm 0
T
n
][
xf
′
yf
′
]
≥ 0,
[
λf
βf
]
≥ 0, tf T
[
λf
βf
]
= 0.
(26)
Now introduce a matrix M¯f to represent the interactions between agent f ’s decision variables (xf , yf ) and
the KKT system of all the other agents, which has the following specific form:
M¯f =

0m×m 0m×n 0m×m 0m×1
0n×m 0n×n 0n×m 0n×1
Im 0m×n 0m×m 0m×1
01×m 01×n 01×m 0
 . (27)
Using this notation, the stacked KKT system (26) for agents f = 1, . . . , F can be formulated as an
LCP(q,M), with the vector q and matrix M given as follows:
q = (q¯1, q¯2, . . . , q¯F )T , where q¯f = (φf , d0, bf )T , (28)
and
M =

M1 M¯2 M¯3 · · · M¯F
M¯1 M2 M¯3 · · · M¯F
...
...
...
...
...
M¯1 M¯2 · · · M¯F−1 MF
 . (29)
Due to the equivalence between an agent f ’s optimization problem (12) and its KKT system (24), the above
LCP(q,M) is equivalent to the corresponding (continuous) DSPI game in the sense that a candidate point
(χ1, χ2, . . . , χF ), where χf = (xf , yf ), is an equilibrium to the DSPI game if and only if there exist
associated Lagrangian multipliers such that they together solve the LCP(q,M).
Methods for solving LCPs fall broadly into two categories: (i) pivotal methods such as Lemke’s algo-
rithm, and (ii) iterative methods such as splitting schemes and interior point methods. The former class of
methods are finite when applicable, while the latter class converge to solutions in the limit. In general, the
applicability of these algorithms depends on the structural properties of the matrix M . In the following
analysis, we show that LCP(q,M) for the DSPI game, as defined in (28) and (29), possesses two prop-
erties that allow us to use Lemke’s pivotal algorithm: (i) the matrix M is a copositive matrix, and (ii)
q ∈ (SOL(0,M))∗.2
2Given a set K ∈ Rd, the set K∗ denotes the dual cone of K; i.e. K∗ = {y ∈ Rd : yTx ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K}.
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We first show thatM is copositive. Recall that a matrixM ∈ Rd×d is said to be copositive if xTMx ≥ 0
for all x ∈ Rd+.
Lemma 1. M defined as in (29) is copositive.
Proof. Let w ∈ R2m+n+1+ . Using the block structure of M given in (29), wTMw can be decomposed as
follows.
wTMw =
F∑
f=1
wf
T
Mfwf +
F∑
f=1
F∑
f ′=1
f ′ 6=f
wf
T
M¯f
′
wf
′
. (30)
We analyze the terms in the two summations separately. First consider wf TMfwf for any agent f . Let the
dual variables (λf , βf ) be collectively denoted by δf .
wf
T
Mfwf =
[
χf
T
δf
T
] [
0 −Af T
Af 0
] [
χf
δf
]
= −χf TAf T δf + δf TAfχf = 0.
(31)
Now consider any term of the form wf T M¯f
′
wf
′
:
wf
T
M¯f
′
wf
′
=
[
xf
T
yf
T
λf
T
βf
T
]
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Im 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


xf
′
yf
′
λf
′
βf
′

=
[
xf
T
yf
T
λf
T
βf
]
0
0
xf
′
0
 = λf Txf ′ .
(32)
Combining (31) and (32) we obtain
wTMw =
F∑
f=1
F∑
f ′=1
f ′ 6=f
λf
T
xf
′
. (33)
Since λf ’s and xf
′
’s are the elements of w, w ≥ 0 clearly implies that wTMw ≥ 0.
We now show property (ii) of the LCP(q,M); that is, q ∈ (SOL(0,M))∗.
Lemma 2. Let the vector q and the matrix M be as defined in (28) and (29) respectively. Then q ∈
(SOL(0,M))∗.
Proof. First note that SOL(0,M) 6= ∅ for any M , since 0 is always a solution to LCP(0,M). Now consider
a w ∈ SOL(0,M); i.e. 0 ≤ w ⊥ 0 + Mw ≥ 0. We prove that qTw ≥ 0. Observe that qTw can be
decomposed as follows:
qTw =
F∑
f=1
q¯f
T
wf =
f∑
f=1
(
φf
T
[
xf
yf
]
+ d0
T
λf + bfβf
)
=
F∑
f=1
[
(yf
sf
− yf
tf
) + d0
T
λf + bfβf
]
.
(34)
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The last two terms in the last equality above, d0
T
λf and bfβf , can be easily seen to be nonnegative for
f = 1, . . . F . This is so because w ∈ SOL(0,M) implies that λf , βf ≥ 0, and by assumption d0, bf ≥ 0
for each f = 1, . . . , F .
Now we focus on the first term in the last equality of (34):
∑F
f=1(y
f
sf
− yf
tf
). First since Mw ≥ 0, wf
must solve the system (26) for f = 1, . . . , F , with φf , d0 and bf all set at zeros (as φf , d0 and bf are the
components of the vector q in the LCP(q,M), as defined in (28); and in LCP(0,M), q = 0). In this case,
considering the primal feasibility of wf , we obtain the following:∑
a∈A
cfax
f
a ≤ 0
yfu − yfv +
F∑
f=1
xfu,v ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ A
 for f = 1, . . . , F. (35)
Recall that cfa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and f = 1, . . . , F by assumption. Therefore, (35) implies that xf = 0 for
any agent f . It is easy to see that in this case, we must have
yfu − yfv ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ A, for f = 1, . . . F. (36)
Now consider any sf -tf path Pf . By assumption, there must be at least one such path for each agent f . By
summing up the inequalities (36) over the arcs in the path Pf , we obtain the desired result. In other words,∑
(u,v)∈Pf
yfu − yfv = yfsf − y
f
tf
≥ 0. (37)
Summing up over the agents, we thus have shown that qTw ≥ 0 for any w ∈ SOL(0, M), which completes
the proof.
With Lemma 1 and 2, we can apply the following result from Cottle et al. [12].
Theorem 1. ( [12], Theorem 4.4.13) If M is copositive and q ∈ (SOL(q,M))∗, then Lemke’s method will
always compute a solution, if the problem is nondegenerate.3
As discussed earlier, the LCP approach is not applicable for discrete DSPI games due to the lack of
necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. In the following we develop a decentralized approach that
works for both discrete and continuous DSPI games.
4.3 Gauss-Seidel Algorithm (Algorithm 1)
We first present the basic form of a best response based algorithm. The idea is simple: starting with a
particular feasible decision vector χ0 = (χ10, χ
2
0, . . . , χ
F
0 ) ∈ Ω(χ0), solve the optimization problem of a
particular agent, say, agent 1, with all of the other agents’ actions fixed. Assume an optimal solution exists
to this optimization problem, and denote it as χ1∗1 . The next agent, say, agent 2, solves its own optimization
problem, with the other agents’ actions fixed as well, but with χ10 replaced by χ
1∗
1 . Such an approach is often
referred to as a diagonalization scheme or a Gauss-Seidel iteration, and for the remainder of this paper we
use the latter name to refer to this simple best-response approach.
Consider applying the Gauss-Seidel iteration to a GNEP, with each agent solving the optimization prob-
lem (15), denoted as P(χ−f ). The Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure is presented in Algorithm 1 below.
Note that updates in agent f ’s decisions occur at iteration k only if there is a strict increase in the agent’s
payoff at the iteration. The algorithm can be directly applied to compute an equilibrium of a DSPI game with
3A detailed discussion of degeneracy and cycling in Lemke’s method can be found in Section 4.9 of [12].
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Algorithm 1 Gauss-Seidel Algorithm for a GNEP
Initialize. Choose χ0 = (χ10, . . . , χ
F
0 ) with χ
f
0 ∈ Ξf (χ−f0 ) ∀f ∈ F . Set k ← 0.
Step 1:
for f = 1, 2, . . . , F do
Set χ−fk,f ← (χ1k+1, . . . , χf−1k+1, χf+1k , . . . , χFk );
Solve P(χ−fk,f ) to obtain an optimal solution χ∗k,f ;
if θf (χ∗k,f , χ
−f
k,f ) > θ
f (χfk , χ
−f
k,f ) then Set χ
f
k+1 ← χ∗k,f ;
else Set χfk+1 ← χfk ;
end if
end for
Set χk+1 ← (χ1k+1, . . . , χFk+1).
Set k ← k + 1.
if χk satisfies termination criteria, then STOP; else GOTO Step 1.
discrete interdiction. For finite termination, we fix a tolerance parameter  and use the following stopping
criterion:
‖χk − χk−1‖ ≤ . (38)
Proposition 4. Suppose that the Gauss-Seidel algorithm (Algorithm 1) is applied to the DSPI game with
discrete interdiction, and the termination criterion (38) is used with  < 1. If the algorithm terminates at
χk, then χk is an equilibrium to this problem.
Proof. Since the variables χk are integral for discrete interdiction problems, choosing  < 1 for the ter-
mination criterion will ensure that the algorithm terminates only when successive outer iterates are equal.
Consequently, by the assumption, χk−1 = χk at termination. This also implies that χ
−f
k−1,f = χ
−f
k for
f = 1, . . . , F . By construction of χk, we must then have
χfk = argmin
χf∈Ξf (χ−fk )
θf (χf , χ−fk ).
Clearly, χk must then be an equilibrium.
Even though there is no guarantee that the algorithm will in fact converge, we note that in the discrete
case, it is possible to detect when the algorithm fails to converge. Recall that Ξf (χ−f ) ⊆ Kf for each agent
f ∈ F , where Kf is defined below.
Kf =
(xf , yf )
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(u,v)∈V
cfuvx
f
uv ≤ bf ,
0 ≤ yfu ≤M ∀u ∈ V
 . (39)
Clearly, the set
∏F
f=1K
f is finite. Any intermediate point χk generated by Algorithm 1 must certainly
satisfy the budgetary constraints on xfk and the bound constraints on y
f
k for each agent f . Therefore χk ∈∏F
f=1K
f . In other words, the set of possible points χk generated by Algorithm 1 lies in a finite set. This
means that if the algorithm fails to converge, it must generate a sequence that contains at least one cycle.
The existence of such cycles in non-convergent iterate paths can then be used to detect situations in which
the algorithm fails to converge.
Proposition 4 is likely the best one can do for general DSPI games under discrete interdiction. However,
for the subclass of such games with common source-target pairs, we can in fact prove that the best response
dynamics always terminates in a NE in a finite number of steps.
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Proposition 5. Consider a DSPI game with discrete interdiction with common source-target pairs, and
assume that the initial arc lengths d and arc extensions e are integral. Suppose that Algorithm 1 is applied
to such a problem, and the termination criteria (38) is used with  < 1. Then the algorithm will terminate
finitely at an equilibrium.
Proof. Denote the common source node as s, and the common target node as t. The set of joint feasible
strategies in x under the given assumptions is a finite set. Moreover, all the agents attempt to minimize the
common objective, namely the s-t path length. Note that at any iteration k at which an update occurs for any
agent’s decision, there must then be a strict increase in the s-t path length. Thus there can be no cycles in the
sequence {χk}. Furthermore, since the set of joint feasible strategies is finite, the sequence must terminate
at some point χ∗. It is easy to show that χ∗ must be an equilibrium (cf. Proposition 4).
4.4 Regularized Gauss-Seidel Algorithm (Algorithm 2)
One disadvantage of the “naı¨ve” Gauss-Seidel algorithm described above is that for continuous GNEPs, it
can fail to converge to equilibria. However, Facchinei et al. [19] showed that under certain assumptions,
we can overcome this issue by adding a regularization term to the individual agent’s problem solved in a
Gauss-Seidel iteration.
The regularized version of the optimization problem for agent f ∈ F is
maximize
χf
θf (χf , χ−f )− τ
∥∥∥χf − χf∥∥∥2
subject to χf ∈ Ξf (χ−f ),
(40)
where τ is a positive constant. Here the regularization term is evaluated in relation to a candidate point
χf . Note that the point χf and the other agents’ decision variables χ−f are fixed when the problem (40) is
solved. We refer to problem (40) as R(χ−f , χf ). The regularized Gauss-Seidel procedure, herein referred
to as Algorithm 2, is simply Algorithm 1, except that R(χ−f , χf ) is solved in each iteration k instead of
P(χ−fk,f ), with χf given by χfk , for each f .
This version of the algorithm, along with its convergence proof, was originally presented in [19] to solve
GNEPs with shared constraints. The difficulty here that prevents us from showing convergence lies in the
fact that we are dealing with GNEPs with non-shared constraints. As a result, any intermediate points re-
sulting from an agent’s best responses need not to be feasible in the other agents’ problems. Consequently,
we use Algorithm 2 only as a heuristic algorithm to solve DSPI games under continuous interdiction. Nev-
ertheless, we can show that if Algorithm 2 converges, then the resulting point is an equilibrium to the DSPI
game.
Proposition 6. Let {χk} be the sequence generated by applying Algorithm 2 to the DSPI problem under
continuous interdiction, wherein each agent solves (13). Suppose {χk} converges to χ¯. Then χ¯ is an
equilibrium to the DSPI problem.
The proof of this proposition is almost identical to that of Theorem 4.3 in Facchinei et al. [19]. However,
we do want to point out one key difference in the proof. In Proposition 6, we need to assume that the
entire sequence {χk} converges to χ¯. This is a strong assumption in the sense that it also requires that
all the intermediate points χk,f in Algorithm 2 to converge to χ¯, a fact key to proving that χ¯ is indeed an
equilibrium. In contrast, for GNEPs with shared constraints, this assumption may be weakened because
the intermediate points χk,f and therefore the cluster points of the sequence generated by the algorithm are
guaranteed to be feasible. The complete proof is presented in Appendix A.
Similar to discrete DSPI games, the convergence of Algorithm 2 can be guaranteed for continuous-
interdiction DSPI games with common source-target pairs. The key fact that allows us to prove this stronger
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result is that by dropping the dependence of the variables y on the agents f ∈ F , any unilateral deviation in
the shared variables y results in a solution that remains feasible in the other agents’ optimization problems.
The convergence result is formally stated below.
Proposition 7. Consider applying Algorithm 2 to the DSPI problem under continuous interdiction with
common source-target pairs, where each agent solves (9). Let {χk} be the sequence generated by the
algorithm. If χ¯ is a cluster point of this sequence, then it also solves the DSPI problem. 
4.5 Numerical Results
We use the algorithms presented in the previous section to study several instances of DSPI games. The
decentralized algorithms were implemented in MATLAB R2010a with CPLEX v12.2 as the optimization
solver. The LCP formulation for the DSPI game with continuous interdiction was solved using the MATLAB
interface for the complementarity solver PATH [20]. Computational experiments were carried out on a
desktop workstation with a quad-core Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GHz of memory running Windows 7.
In the implementation of the decentralized algorithm, for DSPI games with discrete interdiction, we used
Algorithm 1 with τ = 0. For DSPI games with continuous interdiction, we followed a strategy of trying
the “naı¨ve” Gauss-Seidel algorithm – i.e. Algorithm 1 with τ = 0 – first. If this version failed to converge
in 1000 outer iterations, we then set τ to a strictly positive value and used the more expensive regularized
Gauss-Seidel algorithm.
Computing Equilibria
First, we applied the algorithm to Example 2 in Section 3.1.1, which is a DSPI game with continuous
interdiction. In particular, the network is given in Figure 2 and there are 2 agents: agent 1 has an adversary
with source node 1 and target node 5, and agent 2 has an adversary with source node 1 and target node 6.
Both agents have an interdiction budget of 1. The initial arc lengths are 0, and the interdiction costs are equal
for both agents and are given as the arc labels in Figure 2, with  = 2. We set the regularization parameter
τ = 0.01. We were able to obtain a solution within an accuracy of 10−6 in 3 outer iterations.
Furthermore, we obtained multiple Nash equilibria by varying the starting point of the algorithm. All the
equilibria obtained resulted in the same shortest path lengths for each agent. Some of the equilibria obtained
are given in Table 3. The column x0 represents the starting interdiction vector for each agent, the columns
x1N and x
2
N give the equilibrium interdiction vectors for agents 1 and 2, respectively. The seven components
in the vectors of x0, x1N and x
2
N represent the interdiction actions at each of the seven arcs in Figure 2, with
the arcs being ordered as follows: first, the top horizontal arcs (1, 2) and (2, 3), then the vertical arcs (1, 4),
(2, 5) and (3, 6), and finally the bottom horizontal arcs (4, 5) and (5, 6). The remaining two columns in
Table 3 , p1 and p2, give the shortest path lengths for agents 1 and 2 respectively, at the equilibrium χN .
Table 3: Multiple equilibria for the instance of the DSPI game in Example 2
x0 x
1
N x
2
N p1 p2
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.1667, 0.1667, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0.2, 0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.6, 0.4, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.0667, 0.2667, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.2) (0, 0, 0.4, 0.6, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.2667, 0.0667, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.3, 0.3) (0, 0, 0.35, 0.65, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.3167, 0.0167, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0.3, 0.3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.65, 0.35, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.0167, 0.3167, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0.25, 0.25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.625, 0.375, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.0417, 0.2917, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.25, 0.25) (0, 0, 0.375, 0.625, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.2917, 0.0417, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.15, 0.15) (0, 0, 0.425, 0.575, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.2417, 0.0917, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
(0.15, 0.15, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.575, 0.425, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0.0917, 0.2417, 0.6667, 0) 0.6667 0.6667
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a1 a2 a3 . . . aF aF+1
b1 b2 b3 . . . bF bF+1
1 +  1 + 
1 +  1 + 
1 1 1
1 +  1 +  1 + 
1 +  1 +  1 + 
1 1
Figure 3: Network structure for DSPI Example 4
Example 4. To test the algorithm on larger-scale problems, we expanded the instance in Example 2 to larger
network sizes and numbers of agents. For F agents, the graph contains 2(F + 1) vertices with the edges as
shown in Figure 3. The source vertex for all agents is a1. The target vertex for a given agent f is bf+1. The
initial arc lengths are all assumed to be zero. The interdiction costs are the same for all the agents and are
given as the arc labels in Figure 3. All the agents have an interdiction budget of 1. The cost parameter  is
chosen as 2. For discrete interdiction on these graphs, the arc extensions are assumed to be length 1.
The running time and iterations required to compute equilibria for these instances are summarized in
Table 4. The first four columns in the table give the number of outer iterations and runtime for Algorithm 1
over these instances with continuous interdiction. The results indicate that the running time for the central-
ized Lemke’s method increases monotonically with the problem size. However, the running time for the
decentralized method depends not just on the problem size but also on the number of outer iterations. In
general, there is no correlation between these two parameters. Indeed the algorithm is observed to converge
in relatively few iterations even for some large problem instances. This is in stark contrast to the rapid
increase in running time observed for the LCP approach as problem size increases.
It must be noted that the order in which the individual agent problems are solved in the Gauss-Seidel
algorithm plays an important role. Indeed it was found that the algorithm failed to converge for certain
orderings of the agents, but succeeded in finding equilibria quickly for the same instance with other order-
ings. For instance, for a network of size 25, solving the agent problems in their natural order {1, 2, . . . , 25}
resulted in the failure of the “naı¨ve” version of the algorithm to converge even after 1000 outer iterations.
However, with a randomized agent order, the algorithm converged in as few as 13 iterations. It is encour-
aging to note that for the same agent order that resulted in the failure of the naive version, the regularized
method converged to a GNE within 394 outer-iterations with a runtime of 28 wall-clock seconds.
Computation of Efficiency Losses
Using the decentralized algorithm and its potential to find multiple equilibria by starting at different points,
we empirically study the efficiency loss of decentralized interdiction strategies in DSPI games. We focus
first on Example 4, with the underlying network represented in Figure 3. Before computing the average
efficiency losses, we first establish a theoretical bound on the worst-case price of anarchy, for the purpose
of comparison.
We start with the specific instance as depicted in Figure 3. Recall that there are F agents and the source-
target pair for agent f is (a1, bf+1). Note that all paths for all agents contain either the arc (a1, a2) or the arc
(a1, b1). Then one feasible solution to the centralized problem is for each agent to interdict both these arcs
by 1/(2 + ) for a total cost of 1. In this case the length of both arcs become F/(2 + ), giving a shortest
path length of F/(2 + ) for each agent. Note that this is not an equilibrium solution as agent 1 can deviate
unilaterally to interdict arcs (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) by 1/2 to obtain a shortest path length of (F+/2)/(2+).
A Nash equilibrium to this problem is given by the following solution. Agent f interdicts the vertical
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Table 4: Number of iterations and running times for DSPI Example 3.
Continuous Interdiction Discrete Interdiction
Decentralized LCP Decentralized
# Agents # Iters Runtime (s) Runtime (s) # Iters Runtime (s)
5 3 0.0205 0.0290 5 0.1776
10 5 0.0290 0.1833 3 0.1627
15 11 0.1103 0.7534 3 0.2419
20 5 0.0723 2.1106 3 0.3164
25 13 0.2609 4.8167 3 0.4005
30 15 0.4070 10.2256 3 0.5155
35 10 0.3605 17.7387 3 0.5948
40 41 1.7485 30.2382 3 0.7387
45 12 0.6601 48.6280 3 0.8794
50 12 0.7981 75.0420 3 1.0385
arcs (a1, b1), . . . , (af , bf ) by 1/(f(f + 1)) and the arc (af+1, bf+1) by f/(f + 1). Each agent then has
a shortest path length of F/(F + 1). Note that all the sf -tf paths are of equal length for every agent.
Therefore diverting any of the budget to any vertical arcs will result in unequal path lengths and a shorter
shortest path for any agent. Obviously, diverting the budget to interdict any of the horizontal arcs is cost
inefficient because of their higher interdiction cost at 1 + . Thus no agent has an incentive to deviate from
this solution.
We now have a feasible solution to the centralized problem that has an objective value of F/(2 + ) for
each agent, and a Nash equilibrium that has an objective value of F/(F + 1) for each agent. Therefore, by
its definition in (4), the worst-case price of anarchy for the DSPI game depicted in Figure 3 must be at least
(F + 1)/(2 + ).
Using the regularized Gauss-Seidel algorithm we also compute lower bounds on the worst-case price of
anarchy and average efficiency losses for the same network topology with varying number of agents. The
instances we consider are obtained by varying  uniformly in the range of (1.5, 10). For the purpose of
comparison, the numerical results are plotted in Figure 4 below. Note that the average-case efficiency loss
is much lower than the worst-case price of anarchy. For the particular graph structure under consideration,
we observe that the average efficiency loss grows at a much lower rate than the worst-case efficiency loss.
However this observation cannot be generalized to other graph structures and such patterns may only be
discernible by applying a decentralized computational framework as the one we presented.
Example 5. We further tested the decentralized algorithms for continuous interdiction on random graphs
to study average efficiency losses of equilibria of DSPI games on networks with different topologies. For
the random graphs we generated, the input parameters include the number of vertices and the density of
a graph, which is the number of arcs divided by the maximum possible number of arcs. The number of
agents was chosen randomly from the interval (0, |V |/2), and one such number is chosen per vertex set
size. Source-target pairs were chosen at random for each interdictor. Fixing the vertex set, we populated the
arc set by successively generating source-target paths for the agents until the desired density was reached.
We thus ensured connectivity between the source-target pairs for each agent. Costs, initial arc lengths
and interdiction budgets were chosen from continuous uniform distributions. Arc interdiction costs were
assigned uniformly in the range [1, 5]. The budget for each agent f was chosen uniformly from the interval
[bf/10, bf/2], where bf =
∑
a∈A c
f
a . The initial length of each arc was chosen uniformly from [1, 5].
For each combination of vertex set size, the number of agents, and graph density, we generated 25 ran-
dom instances by drawing values from the uniform distributions described above for the various network
parameters. For each instance, we used 10 different random permutations of the agents to run the decentral-
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Figure 4: Efficiency loss with respect to the number of agents.
ized algorithms in an attempt to compute multiple equilibria. The lower bound on the price of anarchy for
the game was computed as the worst case efficiency loss over these 25 instances. The average efficiency loss
over these instances was also computed. The results are summarized in Table 5. Our experiments indicate
that the average efficiency loss and the worst-case price of anarchy tend to grow as the number of vertices
and number of agents increases; on the other hand, these measures of efficiency loss sometimes do not
appear to be monotonically increasing or decreasing with respect to the density of the underlying network.
Table 5: DSPI Continuous Interdiction - Random Graphs
# Vertices # Agents Density Avg. Run Time (s) # Avg Iters. a.e.l p.o.a
5 3 0.25 0.0037 3 1.3133 1.5561
5 3 0.5 0.0038 3 1.3265 1.9529
5 3 0.75 0.0040 3 1.5099 2.3829
10 3 0.25 0.0065 4 1.5366 2.2078
10 3 0.5 0.0176 11 1.4538 2.3114
10 3 0.75 0.0132 8 1.4273 2.1342
15 4 0.25 0.0263 11 1.7091 2.9246
15 4 0.5 0.0939 33 1.7524 2.7904
15 4 0.75 0.1267 42 1.5695 2.1425
20 5 0.25 0.1269 34 2.1907 3.2885
20 5 0.5 0.2087 43 1.8523 2.7906
20 5 0.75 0.5416 100 1.7967 2.3782
25 7 0.25 0.7167 105 2.5631 4.8788
25 7 0.5 1.9564 207 2.3022 5.5794
25 7 0.75 1.8476 158 1.9884 2.4423
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we introduced decentralized network interdiction (DNI) games and gave formulations for one
such class of games – decentralized shortest path interdiction (DSPI) games. We analyzed the theoretical
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properties of DSPI games: in particular, we gave conditions for the existence of equilibria and examples
where multiple equilibria exist. Specifically, we proved the existence of equilibria for general DSPI games
under continuous interdiction. On the other hand, for the discrete counterpart, we provide a counterexample
for existence. However, for the subclass of problems with common source-target pairs, we are able to
provide an existence guarantee.
We also showed that the DSPI game under continuous interdiction is equivalent to a linear comple-
mentarity problem, which can be solved by Lemke’s algorithm. This constitutes a convergent centralized
method to solve such problems. We also presented decentralized heuristic algorithms to solve DSPI games
under both continuous and discrete interdiction. Finally, we used these algorithms to empirically evaluate
the worst case and average efficiency loss of DSPI games.
There are other classes of network interdiction games that can be studied using the same framework
we have developed, where the agents’ obstruction functions are related to the maximum flow or minimum
cost flow in the network. Establishing theoretical results and studying the applicability of the decentralized
algorithms to other classes of decentralized network interdiction games are natural and interesting extensions
of this work.
In our study of DSPI games, we also made the assumption that the games have complete information
structure; that is, the normal form of the game – the set of agents, agents’ feasible action spaces, and their
objective functions – is assumed to be common knowledge to all agents. In addition, we made the implicit
assumption that all input data are deterministic. However, data uncertainty and lack of observability of other
agents’ preferences or actions are prevalent in real-world situations. For such settings, we need to extend
our work to accommodate games with exogenous uncertainties and incomplete information.
One might also be interested in designing interventions to reduce the loss of efficiency resulting from
decentralized control. This leads to the topic of mechanism design. Such a line of work also defines a very
important and interesting future research direction.
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A Proof of Proposition 6
Since χk → χ¯ we must have χfk → χ¯f and
lim
k→∞
∥∥∥χfk+1 − χfk∥∥∥ = 0. (41)
By construction of χk,f , (41) implies that
lim
k→∞
χk,f = χ¯. (42)
By Step 1 of Algorithm 2, χfk+1 ∈ Ξf (χ−fk,f ). Since χfk+1 → χ¯f , χ−fk → χ¯−f , and Ξf (χ−fk,f ) is defined
by linear inequalities parametrized by χ−fk,f , it is straightforward to see by continuity arguments that χ¯
f ∈
Ξf (χ¯−f ). In other words, χ¯ is feasible for every agent’s optimization problem (15).
We claim that for each agent f ∈ F
θf (χ¯f , χ¯−f ) ≥ θf (χf , χ¯−f ), ∀ χf ∈ Ξf (χ¯−f ).
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For the purposes of establishing a contradiction, let there be an agent f¯ and a vector ξ¯f¯ ∈ Ξf¯ (χ¯−f¯ ) such
that
θf¯ (χ¯f¯ , χ¯−f¯ ) < θf¯ (ξ¯f¯ , χ¯−f¯ ).
Using the linearity of the functions that define the set valued mapping Ξf¯ (·) we can show its inner semicon-
tinuity relative to its domain (cf. [34] Chapter 5). Because χ¯−f¯ ∈ dom(Ξf¯ (·)), we then have
lim inf
ξ−f¯→χ¯−f¯
Ξ(ξ−f¯ ) ⊇ Ξ(χ¯−f¯ ), (43)
where the limit in (43) is given by the following:
lim inf
ξ−f¯→χ¯−f¯
Ξ(ξ−f¯ ) =
{
uf¯ | ∀χ−f¯k → χ¯−f¯ ,∃uf¯k → u with uf¯k ∈ Ξf¯ (χ−f¯k )
}
. (44)
Since ξ¯f¯ ∈ Ξf¯ (χ¯−f¯ ), equations (42), (43) and (44) allow us to construct a sequence ξf¯k ∈ Ξf¯ (χ−f¯k,f ) such
that ξf¯k → ξ¯f¯ as k →∞.
Let df¯ = (ξ¯f¯ − χ¯f¯ ). Then by the subdifferentiality inequality for concave functions we must have
θ′f¯ (χ¯f¯ , χ¯−f¯ ; df¯ ) > 0. (45)
Denote by Φf the regularized objective function for agent f ’s subproblem. In other words,
Φf (χf , χ−f , z) = θf (χf , χ−f )− τ
∥∥∥χf − z∥∥∥2 .
We then have
Φ′f (χf , χ−f , z; df ) = θ′f (χf , χ−f ; df )− 2τ(χf − z)Tdf .
Note that χf¯k+1 is obtained by solving the problem R(χ−f¯k,f¯ , χ
f¯
k). In other words, χ
f¯
k+1 maximizes
Φf¯ (ξf¯
k,f¯
, χ−f¯
k,f¯
, χf¯k) over the set Ξ
f¯ (χ−f¯
k,f¯
). Since this is a concave maximization problem, we then apply
first order optimality conditions to obtain the following.
Φ′f¯ (χf¯k+1, χ
−f¯
k,f¯
, χf¯k ; (ξ
f¯
k − χf¯k+1)) = θ′f¯ (χf¯k+1, χ−f¯k,f¯ , χ
f¯
k ; (ξ
f¯
k − χf¯k+1))
+ 2τ(χf¯k+1 − χ−f¯k )(ξf¯k − χf¯k+1)
≤ 0.
(46)
Passing to the limit k →∞, k ∈ K and using (42) we obtain
0 ≥ θ′f¯ (χ¯f , χ¯−f ; (ξ¯f − χ¯f ))
which contradicts (45).
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